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CHAPTER NINE
SPINOZA’S ACTUALIST MODEL OF POWER
Valtteri Viljanen
Introduction
It seems fair to say that Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–77) is not a 
thinker whose philosophical system would have traditionally been seen 
as particularly dynamistic in character, or considered in any special 
way associated with concepts connected with power—or with activity, 
for that matter. Th is is echoed in G. W. F. Hegel’s estimation, declar-
ing Spinoza’s substance to be “a rigid and unyielding” one that “does 
not open itself out, and therefore comes to no vitality, spirituality or 
activity”.1 It is, however, defective to view Spinoza along these lines, 
for thereby it is not properly taken into account that such concepts as 
power (potentia), force (vis), and striving (conatus) frequently appear 
in his works, and in focal places. Fortunately, the pertinence of these 
notions is nowadays all the more often duly emphasized. Indeed, 
since the late 1960s French scholarship has acknowledged Spinoza’s 
dynamistic tendencies widely enough for a recent commentator to 
contend, “Spinozism is generally (and justifi ably) considered to be a 
philosophy of ‘power’ ”.2 Also on the other side of the Atlantic, power 
and related notions have begun to fi gure in many analyses of Spinoza’s 
philosophy,3 and interest in these aspects of his thought shows no signs 
of diminution.
1 Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy III, p. 288.
2 Ramond, Dictionnaire Spinoza, p. 147, translation mine. Gilles Deleuze’s Expres-
sionism in Philosophy: Spinoza that appeared in the tumultuous year of 1968 is the 
key work; but already Sylvain Zac’s L’Idée de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza (1963) 
contains, I think, dynamistic overtones. For recent readings belonging to this tradition 
and classifi able as dynamistic, see Bove, La stratégie du conatus, Jaquet, L’unite du corps 
et de l’esprit and Les expressions de la puissance d’agir chez Spinoza; Rizk, Comprendre 
Spinoza; Sévérac, Le devenir actif chez Spinoza; Spindler, Philosophie de la puissance 
et determination de l’homme chez Spinoza et chez Nietzsche. 
3 Barbone, “What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?”; Della Rocca, “Spinoza’s 
Metaphysical Psychology” and “Th e Power of an Idea”; Garrett, “Representation and 
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All this notwithstanding, the main concept of the present anthol-
ogy, active power, is not, to my knowledge, to be found in Spinoza’s 
oeuvre. He does, however, employ the notion of power of acting (agendi 
potentia), especially in the Ethics. Th is raises the question, if Spinoza 
uses both ‘power’ and ‘power of acting’, what is the diff erence between 
the two? What else could power be, for Spinoza, but power of acting?4 
What is the relationship between power and activity in his system? It 
is by trying to fi nd answers to these questions that I will endeavour to 
locate Spinoza’s position with regard to the main topic of this volume; 
what is more, thereby emerges what may be called an actualist model 
of God’s power.
Defi ning the basic concepts
Power in Spinoza’s monism
We should begin by outlining the basic role the concept of power 
plays in Spinoza’s system. Why does he allow it to his metaphysics in 
the fi rst place? If we take a look at his masterpiece, the Ethics, ‘power’ 
makes its entrance in the eleventh proposition of the opening part—but 
merely in the second alternative demonstration and in the scholium 
of that proposition. Only near the end of the opening part we fi nd the 
proposition that, to a great extent, assigns the dynamic concept its place 
in the Spinozistic framework:
Consciousness in Spinoza’s Naturalistic Th eory of the Imagination”; Huenemann, “Th e 
Necessity of Finite Modes and Geometrical Containment in Spinoza’s Metaphysics”; 
Lin, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Desire” and “Teleology and Human Action in Spinoza”; 
Parkinson, “Spinoza on the Power and Freedom of Man” and “Spinoza’s Concept of 
the Rational Act”; Rice, “Action in Spinoza’s Account of Aff ectivity” count among 
noteworthy Anglo-American studies. Juhani Pietarinen’s (“Th e Rationality of Desires 
in Spinoza’s Ethics” and “Spinoza on Causal Explanation of Action”) work belongs to 
this tradition, and has been particularly inspiring for me; my Spinoza’s Dynamics of 
Being attempts to give a unifi ed view of the role of the concept of power in Spinoza’s 
metaphysics (see also my “Field Metaphysic, Power, and Individuation in Spinoza” and 
“On the Derivation and Meaning of Spinoza’s Conatus Doctrine”).
4 I would like to thank Don Garrett for pointing out to me this question and its 
importance.
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God’s power [potentia] is his essence itself.5
For from the necessity alone of God’s essence it follows that God is the 
cause of himself (by p11) and (by p16 and p16c) of all things. Th erefore, 
God’s power, by which he and all things are and act, is his essence itself, 
q.e.d.6
For the moment we can leave aside the question of what, exactly, does 
it mean that ‘all things follow from the necessity of God’s essence’, and 
simply focus on the fact that the quote above displays a clear connec-
tion between causal effi  cacy and power: the central idea seems to be 
that as God’s essence causes everything there is, it must be equated 
with power. Th e demonstration is built on two very basic propositions, 
E1p11 and p16; this allows, I believe Spinoza to think, establishing a 
clear and unequivocal meaning to the concept of power by showing 
how it fi gures in his overall view of the fundamental causal architecture 
of the world. In that architecture, there is strictly speaking only one 
cause, the only substance, God or Nature, without which “nothing can 
be or be conceived” (E1p15). And precisely the propositions cited in 
E1p34d explicate God’s basic causal capacities. First, to present things 
in an extremely brief manner, as existence is involved already in God’s 
essence, God is the cause of himself and a necessarily existing being 
(E1p11); and so it can be said that God’s causal effi  cacy results in his 
own existence. But, second, God is not only causa sui but also causa 
rerum, because from God’s essence everything possible necessarily fol-
lows (E1p16); and so it can be said that God’s causal effi  cacy results 
in active production of an infi nity of modifi cations, also fi nite things 
such as human beings.
We are now in a position to delineate a rough working formulation 
of power in Spinoza’s system: power means capacity to bring about 
eff ects; and given what Spinoza says about the nature of the eff ects of 
God’s causality, it is only consistent that Spinoza talks about power both 
to exist and to act. With regard to fi nite things, the exact import of 
power’s twofold meaning remains yet to be discerned, but at this point 
5 E1p34. I have used the following method in referring to the Ethics: a = axiom, 
app = appendix, c = corollary, d = defi nition (when not aft er a proposition number), 
d = demonstration (when aft er a proposition number), le = lemma, p = proposition, 
po = postulate, pr = preface, s = scholium. For instance, E1p8s2 refers to the second 
scholium of the eighth proposition in the fi rst part of the Ethics.
6 E1p34d.
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it seems clear—and worth mentioning given the ill reputation that has 
overshadowed the modern history of the concept—that Spinoza shows 
no signs of considering this sort of notion of power as somehow obscure 
or in special need of defence: inserted into his philosophical system that 
tracks down the world thoroughly intelligible to its minutest detail, what 
we have is a completely proper and useful causal notion. 
We should still observe one important aspect pertaining to power and 
Spinoza’s peculiar monistic system: the radically novel philosophical 
theology of the Ethics is set up to give demystifi ed—maybe one could say 
adequately ‘philosophized’—accounts of such divine attributes as infi n-
ity, simplicity, eternity, and activity; no doubt, Spinoza’s understanding 
of God’s power is supposed to explicate what another traditional notion, 
that of omnipotence, really means. Th e tenet that God’s causal power is 
ubiquitous in the world is, of course, a commonplace in philosophical 
theology,7 and E1p34’s claim that God’s essence or power is ultimately 
responsible for everything there is can be regarded as its Spinozistic 
counterpart. Moreover and more interestingly, Spinoza’s position can be 
depicted as a solution to the following old problem plaguing scholastic 
theology, the so-called problem of secondary causation.8 Assigning 
powers to natural agents seemed to create a problem for the medievals, 
which is formulated by Francisco Suárez as, “to whatever extent effi  cient 
causality is attributed to the creature, to that extent the divine power of 
the creator is diminished. For either God does everything, or he does 
not do everything. Th e latter detracts from the divine effi  cacy”.9 In other 
words, as recent commentators have noted,10 two fundamental tenets 
of scholasticism are in tension with each other: the omnipotence of the 
transcendent God and fi nite things’ causal effi  cacy. And it is precisely 
here that Spinoza’s immanent conception of divine power has its full 
 7 As Alfred Freddoso (“Medieval Causation and the Case against Secondary Causa-
tion in Nature”, p. 74) puts it: “Central to the western theistic understanding of divine 
providence is the conviction that God is the sovereign Lord of nature. He created the 
physical universe and continually conserves it in existence. What’s more, He is always 
and everywhere active in it by His power. Th e operations of nature, be they minute or 
catastrophic, commonplace or unprecedented, are the work of His hands, and without 
His constant causal infl uence none of them would or could occur.”
 8 Freddoso’s “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary Causation 
in Nature” off ers a particularly enlightening treatment of this topic.
 9 On Effi  cient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19, 18.1.2. It should be 
noted that Suárez (ibid.) himself did not think that this problem was a very serious one.
10 Freddoso, “Medieval Causation and Case against Secondary Causation in Nature”, 
pp. 77–78, 92–93; Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 251.
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import. Now, Spinozistic fi nite things are modifi cations of God, and 
this allows Spinoza to hold that ultimately there is only one power, but 
one that is expressed “in a certain and determinate manner” through 
the essences of fi nite things. As Spinoza himself explains,
[t]he power by which singular things (and consequently, [any] man) 
preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature (by 1p24c), 
not insofar as it is infi nite, but insofar as it can be explained through the 
man’s actual essence (by 3p7). Th e man’s power, therefore, insofar as it is 
explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature’s infi nite 
power, that is (by 1p34), of its essence.11
Spinoza puts his point also the other way around by claiming that “the 
universal power of Nature as a whole is nothing but the power of all 
individual things taken together”.12 So, Spinoza holds unambiguously 
that we are dealing with immanent God’s power in its diff erent expres-
sions, “God is the [. . .] immanent cause of all things” (E1p18); as Don 
Garrett succinctly puts it, “whatever power singular things have is at 
the same time also (a share of ) God’s power, power that God expresses 
through singular things”.13 I think it is hard to deny that this scheme of 
things does a far better job than the traditional transcendental ones, be 
they of e.g. the Aristotelian or the Cartesian kind, in reconciling God’s 
omnipotence with the causal power of fi nite things. Of course, how ever 
philosophically gratifying this kind of monistic dynamism may be, it 
comes with the price of heterodoxy.
Before moving on, a terminological observation is in order. In the 
Ethics, Spinoza uses both ‘power’ (potentia) and ‘force’ (vis), the for-
mer being the much more common one. On the whole, he seems to 
be using the two terms interchangeably: “Th e force of any passion, or 
aff ect, can surpass the other actions, or power, of a man, so that the 
aff ect stubbornly clings to the man” (E4p6).14 In a couple of places 
he equates them without further ado: “[F]orce, or power” (E4p60d). 
“[T]here is also no comparison between the power, or [seu] forces, of 
the Mind and those of the Body” (E5pr, emphasis added). Th us, it is 
hard to say anything very specifi c about how the two notions possibly 
diff er from each other; but judging from the contexts in which they 
11 E4p4d.
12 Th eological-Political Treatise, XVI.2.
13 Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument”, p. 140.
14 See also E2p45s, 4pr, p3, p5, p18d, p26d.
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are most oft en placed, ‘power’ seems to be the one Spinoza practically 
always uses when he is dealing with the most fundamental metaphysical 
issues, especially those that pertain to God, whereas ‘force’ is sometimes 
used when discussing dynamism pertaining to fi nite things. Apart from 
potentia and vis, there is also a third term oft en translated as ‘power’: 
potestas. As has been suggested, that notion refers to the control or 
authority an individual may obtain over its environment by exercising 
its potentia.15
Activity and Spinoza’s essentialism
Spinoza defi nes activity as follows: “I say that we act [agere] when 
something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate 
cause, i.e. (by d1), when something in us or outside us follows from 
our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it 
alone” (E3d2). So, hardly surprisingly, also action is a causally potent 
notion. About the defi nition it can be safely observed that in Spinoza’s 
technical usage, a thing is said to be active, or an agent, when it is the 
sole, complete, or total cause of an eff ect: a causal factor in addition to 
which nothing else is needed for the eff ect to be realized. And as it is an 
axiom for Spinoza that eff ects are known through their causes (E1a4), 
in such a case there is only one thing, the agent, on whom knowledge 
concerning the eff ect depends.
Th ings become more complicated, though, when attention is drawn 
to the fact that the defi nition contains a crucial explicative reference 
to what “follows from our nature” i.e., from our essence. Th e same 
phrase is, conspicuously enough, to be found also in the defi nition of 
passivity: “[W]e are acted on [pati] when something happens in us, 
or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial 
cause” (E3d2). In other words, that something follows from a thing’s 
nature is fundamental for both activity and passivity, thus evidently a 
literally essential ingredient in any kind of causal occurrence. What is 
here at stake? When discussing the twofold meaning of power, we noted 
that in E1p34d Spinoza takes himself to be entitled to claim God to be 
the cause of all things on grounds of E1p16, the proposition arguably 
explicating the nature of God’s activity. Also that pivotal proposition 
contains a reference to what follows from the essence:
15 Barbone, “What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?”, pp. 102–104.
 spinoza’s actualist model of power 219
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infi nitely many 
things in infi nitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall under 
an infi nite intellect.)16
Th is Proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to the fact 
that the intellect infers from the given defi nition of any thing a number 
of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., from the very 
essence of the thing); and that it infers more properties the more the 
defi nition of the thing expresses reality, i.e., the more reality the essence 
of the defi ned thing involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely 
infi nite attributes (by d6), each of which also expresses an essence infi -
nite in its own kind, from its necessity there must follow infi nitely many 
things in infi nite modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infi nite 
intellect), q.e.d.17
Th e fi rst corollary of this proposition is, “[f]rom this it follows that God 
is the effi  cient cause of all things which can fall under an infi nite intel-
lect” (E1p16c1).
We can start unpacking these startling claims by observing that they 
presuppose a theory of defi nitions, essences (or natures), inferring, and 
following. A detailed discussion of this intricate theory and its implica-
tions, as well as its relation to geometrical thought, is out of the scope 
of this paper,18 but simplifying matters slightly the basic idea can be 
presented as follows. Each and every thing, also God, has its own pecu-
liar essence; that essence is thoroughly intelligible, it can be perfectly 
captured by a defi nition. Both the essence and the defi nition have a 
certain structure: from the defi nition certain properties can be inferred, 
and this expresses those things that necessarily follow from—evidently, 
are brought about by—the essence in question. Now, little of this may 
be, at least for us, immediately transparent; but one sure conclusion 
we can draw is that each and every true Spinozistic thing is causally 
effi  cacious by virtue of its essence. Th is is confi rmed by such later claims 
as “[n]othing exists from whose nature some eff ect does not follow” 
(E1p36) and “things are able [to produce] nothing but what follows 
necessarily from their determinate nature” (E3p7d).19
16 E1p16.
17 E1p16d.
18 For a paper discussing these topics in length, see my “Spinoza’s Essentialist Model 
of Causation”.
19 In fact, laying emphasis on this strand in Spinoza’s thought is nowadays one 
prominent position in scholarship. Garrett holds, “[i]n Spinoza’s view, something is an 
individual thing only to the extent that it has some nature or essence through whose 
genuine activity eff ects can be understood to follow” (“Teleology in Spinoza and Early 
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Th us, it is only consistent that Spinoza equips his defi nition of action 
with the reference to essential ‘following’; and given the linkage between 
power and causal effi  cacy, we can say that due to this essential causal 
thrust, Spinozistic things are endowed with power to bring about eff ects 
derivable from their defi nitions. In Spinoza’s world, the ultimate source 
of power is located in essences—from the adequate monistic viewpoint, 
in God’s essence. Th us, Spinozistic things can be said to be intrinsically 
dynamic in character, and when a thing accomplishes something by its 
own essential causal power alone, with no input from other causes, it 
qualifi es as an agent.20 On the uncontroversial assumption that things 
have power of acting when they are active, such a case equals exercising 
power of acting in bringing about the eff ect in question. With these 
basics in place, we can start fl eshing out answers to the questions posed 
in the beginning of this paper.
Th e actualist model of God’s power
Necessitarianism and power
It is uncontroversial that Spinoza’s God can be only purely active, 
ultimately the adequate cause of each and every thing (see E1p25). 
Th is is so already because there is nothing else besides God’s power 
that could bring about eff ects. But things appear more interesting, 
and challenging, when we consider the way in which God’s power is 
Modern Rationalism”, p. 330), and “an individual [. . .] exists to the extent that there 
is instantiated a defi nite essence or nature that can serve as a locus of causal activity. 
Where there is such an essence, properties follow (both causally and logically) from 
that essence” (“Spinoza’s Conatus Argument”, p. 150). Martin Lin, another proponent 
of this line of interpretation, puts things even more to the point: “[T]hings are caus-
ally effi  cacious only in virtue of their essences” (“Teleology and Human Action in 
Spinoza”, p. 343).
20 In fact, here lurks a problem, to my knowledge fi rst formulated by Martha Kneale 
(“Leibniz and Spinoza on Activity”, p. 217):
One surprising proposition is involved in Defi nition II, namely, that something 
can happen outside a given mode which can be clearly and distinctly understood 
in terms of the nature of that mode alone. Th is is surprising because the general 
doctrine of Part II of the Ethics seems to imply that any transaction involving 
two or more modes can be fully understood only in terms of the nature of all 
of them. 
I believe a fairly satisfactory answer can be given to this dilemma (see my Spinoza’s 
Dynamics of Being, chapter 5); but discussing this would take us too far afi eld.
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exercised. Here Spinoza’s dynamism meets his necessitarianism.21 One 
of the longest scholia of the fi rst part of the Ethics reveals Spinoza’s 
mindset concerning these matters:
Others think that God is a free cause because he can (so they think) bring 
it about that the things which we have said follow from his nature (i.e., 
which are in his power) do not happen or are not produced by him. But 
this is the same as if they were to say that God can bring it about that it 
would not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are 
equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause the eff ect would not 
follow—which is absurd. [. . .] 
Moreover, even if they conceive God to actually understand in the 
highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring it about that all 
the things he actually understands exist. For they think that in that way 
they would destroy God’s power. If he had created all the things in his 
intellect (they say), then he would have been able to create nothing more, 
which they believe to be incompatible with God’s omnipotence. So they 
preferred to maintain that God is indiff erent to all things, not creating 
anything except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will.
But I think I have shown clearly enough (see p16) that from God’s 
supreme power, or infi nite nature, infi nitely many things in infi nitely 
many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily fl owed, or always follow, by 
the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle 
it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to 
two right angles. So God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity and 
will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, at least in 
my opinion, God’s omnipotence is maintained far more perfectly.
Indeed—to speak openly—my opponents seem to deny God’s omnipo-
tence. For they are forced to confess that God understands infi nitely many 
creatable things, which nevertheless he will never be able to create. For 
otherwise, if he created everything he understood [NS: to be creatable] he 
would (according to them) exhaust his omnipotence and render himself 
imperfect. Th erefore to maintain that God is perfect, they are driven to 
maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which 
his power extends. I do not see what could be feigned which would be 
more absurd than this or more contrary to God’s omnipotence.22
Undoubtedly, this kind of power should not be confused “with the human 
power or right of Kings” (E2p3s). But at least two interrelated subtler 
21 It has been a contested issue whether Spinoza is a necessitarianist or merely a 
causal determinist; but I take it that Garrett (“Spinoza’s Necessitarianism”) and Olli 
Koistinen (“On the Consistency of Spinoza’s Modal Th eory”; “Spinoza’s Proof of Neces-
sitarianism”) have convincingly showed the former to be the case.
22 E1p17s.
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points emerge from the quote above. First, God’s power could not be 
exercised in any other manner it is actually exercised any more than a 
triangle could have some other sum of internal angles it actually has. 
Second, all God’s power is completely used in bringing about all he can 
understand, i.e. in realizing what can be inferred from his defi nition.23 
Th e upshot is that there is no unexercised power, all power is exercised 
with an ironclad necessity. In Spinoza’s necessitarianism, there are 
neither unrealized possibilities nor power that would remain merely 
potential.
Here we can, I think, especially acutely feel the impact the new science 
has on Spinoza’s thought. In the Peripatetic framework, natural changes 
were understood as end-governed actualisations of potentialities. Now, 
already the fact that the very word ‘power’ is in Latin ‘potentia’ implies 
that this had a major eff ect on how power was conceived: powers are 
potential capacities for change that, if exercised, end in something 
actual.24 For instance, a seed has the power or potential to become 
a tree; if placed in suitable circumstances, the exercise of that power 
begins and becomes manifested as an actual tree. With the dawn of the 
modern era, things begin to look quite diff erent. Consider how radically 
Descartes’ mechanics-inspired view on material things’ power diff ers 
from the Aristotelian one: in the Principles of Philosophy, he consid-
ers any body to have a force (vis) understood simply as a tendency to 
persist in the prevailing state (PP II.43; CSM I, 243), and the intensity 
of this force can be measured in terms of speed and size.25 Clearly, the 
Cartesian notion of force has no essential connection with actualisation 
of potentialities. What we are dealing with is actual causal effi  cacy of a 
certain strength and direction.
It is precisely the traditional potential-actual framework that Spinoza 
discards, thereby following the example set by Descartes. As Bernard 
23 Pascal Sévérac (Le devenir actif chez Spinoza, pp. 33–35) stresses, rightly, that 
God’s power is always completely exhausted in producing everything it can. Also Alan 
Donagan (“Spinoza’s Proof of Immortality”, p. 248) has drawn attention to this: “As 
he [Spinoza] used the word, ‘potentia’ fundamentally means power displayed in doing 
something. In God there is no potentia that is not exercised. Hence God’s power and 
his action are not really distinct: whatever he has power to do, he does.”
24 See Des Chene, Physiologia, pp. 23, 29.
25 See PP II.36, II.43 (CSM I, pp. 240, 243); Gabbey, “Force and Inertia in the Seven-
teenth Century”, p. 243; Garber, “Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus”, 
pp. 44–45; Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 340.
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Rousset observes, being in potentia was traditionally contrasted with, 
and thought to be inferior to, being in actu, because the former was 
taken to mean that one has not yet been realized. But this distinction 
does not hold for Spinoza: being powerful (‘in potentia’) is to be actual.26 
Consider also the way in which Leibniz summarizes the traditional 
position: “If ‘power’ corresponds to the Latin potentia, it is contrasted 
with ‘act’, and the transition from power into act is ‘change’.”27 But 
as the above-quoted scholium testifi es, there is no such contrast in 
Spinoza’s system, and Spinoza himself stresses the actuality of power 
by contending, “God’s omnipotence has been actual from eternity and 
will remain in the same actuality to eternity” (E1p17s). Th is kind of 
actualism clearly stems from his necessitarianism, and as a consequence 
it is fi tting, I think, to regard this as an actualist view to power. In 
contemporary metaphysics of modality, actualism is a main overall 
position whose general idea can be said to be that there is only one 
world, the actual physical one, and the only existent things are those 
inhabiting that actual world.28 Although there is undoubtedly no room 
in Spinoza’s ontology for any other world than the actual one, it would, 
of course, be bizarre and misleading to depict him as taking a stand 
in a contemporary debate. If, however, actualism is defi ned loosely as 
an ontological position according to which there are no unactualized 
possibilities,29 Spinoza surely counts as an actualist,30 and so does his 
view of power. Th ere is thus no discrepancy between Spinoza’s neces-
sitarianism and dynamism; together, they amount to what may be called 
the actualist view of God’s power.
26 Rousset, “Les implications de l’identité spinoziste de l’être et de la puissance”, p. 11. 
Charles Ramond (Dictionnaire Spinoza, p. 147) notes similarly that for Spinoza power 
does not carry the traditional connotation of incompleteness or virtuality (see also 
Misrahi, 100 mots sur l’Éthique de Spinoza, p. 308; Rizk, Comprendre Spinoza, pp. 
45–46).
27 New Essays on Human Understanding 2.21.
28 Lycan, “Th e Metaphysics of Possibilia”, p. 307.
29 Here I am following Timo Kajamies (“Descartes: Libertarianist, Necessitarianist, 
Actualist?”, p. 53), who examines the debate concerning Descartes’ alleged actualism 
and necessitarianism.
30 Kajamies discusses briefl y also Spinoza’s case as a preliminary to that of Descartes 
and contends, “Spinoza famously endorsed full-blown actualism” (“Descartes: Liber-
tarianist, Necessitarianist, Actualist?”, p. 83).
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Power of acting and the actualist model
Th e discussion thus far has mostly been structured around Spinoza’s 
monistic commitments. I think this is justifi ed, for otherwise his ‘big 
picture’ would be left  in the dark, most probably resulting in fl awed 
understanding of his thought. On the present interpretation, Spinoza 
develops an actualist model of God-Nature’s power in which everything 
is what it is and the way it is because all possibles (i.e. everything deriv-
able from God’s defi nition) are realized by God’s power as necessitated 
by the laws of God’s nature. Fair enough; but what does this tell us 
about fi nite power, existence, and action? Similarly, we have seen that 
exercising power of acting means being the only causal source of, the 
only power behind, some eff ect. With regard to God, this makes the 
answer to the basic question posed in the beginning—what else could 
power be but power of acting?—evident: nothing. God’s power can 
only be active, so his power equals power of acting. Once again, fair 
enough; but what about the situation in which we fi nite existents fi nd 
ourselves? Spinoza’s actualist view of God’s power has ample implica-
tions for his theory of fi nite things’ power, and it is precisely here that 
things become considerably more complicated. 
We can begin by noting the general importance of the notion of 
power of acting: it does a remarkable amount of work in Spinoza’s 
theory of human existence. In the third part of the Ethics, which deals 
with the origin and nature of human emotions (or aff ects), the concept 
is in play right from the start. Th e main topic is defi ned in its terms:
By aff ect I understand aff ections of the Body by which the Body’s power 
of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same 
time, the ideas of these aff ections.31
So human emotions are, ultimately, changes in our power of acting. 
From what has been said about God’s power, it follows that his power 
of acting cannot undergo change but is always unlimited, or as Spinoza 
would say, infi nite; but, obviously, this is not our case. Th e following 
passage tells us something decisive about the notion’s role in Spinoza’s 
system:
But the main thing to note is that when I say that someone passes from 
a lesser to a greater perfection, and the opposite, I do not understand 
that he is changed from one essence, or form, to another. For example, a 
31 E3d3.
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horse is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if it is changed 
into an insect. Rather, we conceive that his power of acting, insofar as it 
is understood through his nature, is increased or diminished.32
In other words, changes in power of acting can occur while the indi-
vidual retains its identity (its ‘essence or form’ does not change—or, 
presumably, does not become destroyed). Th is reveals that Spinoza 
uses the concept of power of acting in order to explain changes of 
perfection taking place in temporal individuals; and, obviously, for his 
ethical theory the most notable kinds of changes in power are those 
that result in human emotions.
Power of acting pertains, however, only to those cases in which we 
are active; and, fi nite and limited creatures as we are, not all of our 
power is exercised to bring about actions. Remember that also patients 
are, according to Spinoza’s defi nition, causally powerful: we are passive 
“when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, 
of which we are only a partial cause” (E3d2, emphasis added). A partial 
cause, but a cause nevertheless. We can, I think, now begin to see why 
‘power’ and ‘power of acting’ cannot be identifi ed without further ado. 
Th ere is a core sense of ‘exercising power’: being able to cause eff ects, 
operating as a causal factor in a causal occurrence; but not all factors 
involved in causal occurrences are agents. I think Spinoza would say 
that those factors exercise power, but not power of acting. Presumably, 
they could be said to exercise power of existing, for even under the 
infl uence of external causes, things strive to maintain their existence, 
as Spinoza’s famous doctrine of conatus power states (E3p6, p7).
I would like to suggest that the actualist line of thought concerning 
God’s power underpins Spinoza’s theory of fi nite human existence in 
the following manner. All of our power is always completely exercised. 
Th ere is no power that could remain to any degree potential: things 
are always fully causally operative,33 and are so of their own accord. 
In plainer words, all fi nite individuals always do everything they can.34 
Th ings always use all of their power to full measure, what alters is the 
32 E4pr.
33 Th is does not, however, mean that the amount of an individual’s total power 
could not alter, just that whatever power an individual is endowed with is always 
exhaustively exercised.
34 My account is in concordance with what Donagan (“Spinoza’s Proof of Immortal-
ity”, pp. 248–249) says about power of acting (although he seems to mean by it what I 
would call simply power) of fi nite things: “[I]t does not follow, in Spinoza’s view, that 
the power of acting of a fi nite thing is not necessarily exercised. Finite things diff er 
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way in which and the extent to which this power is used to produce 
actions, to which extent passions. Precisely this interests Spinoza 
the most, and is what he fi nds ethically relevant: clearly, the aim of 
Spinoza’s ethics is to be maximally active, to have a lot of power of 
acting, to produce actions the nature of which depends wholly on our 
own essence. 
Th e aforesaid has taken place at an admittedly general and abstract 
metaphysical level. How could the exercise of agendi potentia be illus-
trated? When someone is having a high level of power of acting, how 
does it appear at the surface phenomenal level? An answer to this ques-
tion that would probably be shared and accepted by many scholars is 
that having power of acting equals, roughly, being capable of behaving 
in many diff erent ways so that one has power over one’s environment.35 
Now, there is no doubt truth in this; it is very important for us to 
exercise our power of acting so that we cause certain aspects of eff ects 
that inhere in other things, because this allows us to control over our 
environment,36 without which forming societies and ensuring suit-
able material conditions for fulfi lling human life would be impossible. 
However, this is hardly the ultimate goal of Spinoza’s ethics but only 
the means to the sort of exercise of our power of acting that equals, for 
Spinoza, true freedom and happiness: adequate causing of immanent 
eff ects, that is, forming adequate ideas in our minds.37 Moreover, these 
changes in the level of our activity form the basic causal architecture 
of our emotions: to the extent our striving power is hindered, we feel 
sadness, and to the extent we succeed in freely exercising our own 
power, we feel joy. 
To round off  this discussion and to obtain still a sharper view of 
Spinoza’s line of thought, let us consider some notable diff erences 
between Spinoza’s position stemming from his actualist cast of mind 
from infi nite ones in that their power of acting is limited by other fi nite things. [. . .] 
Strictly speaking, everything at every moment exercises its full power of acting.”
35 Th is characterization contains features of those made by Carriero, “Spinoza on 
Final Causality”, p. 130; Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, p. 46; Rice, 
“Action in Spinoza’s Account of Aff ectivity”, p. 157.
36 On grounds of Barbone’s (“What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?”, pp. 
102–104) interpretation, we may in such cases be said to have potestas that derives 
from our potentia.
37 Spinoza writes in the Th eological-Political Treatise, III.7–8, “much can be eff ected 
by human contrivance and vigilance to achieve security and to avoid injuries from 
other men and from beasts” by organizing a society or state, the purpose of which “is 
to achieve security and ease”. Without this ease, I take it, it would be impossible to 
engage in intellectual activities.
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and some dominant traditional conceptions of natural things’ power and 
causality. First, the idea that things are fully causally effi  cacious left  to 
their own devices, needing nothing extrinsic to act, is radically at odds 
with the familiar Th omist tenet, “what is in potency cannot reduce itself 
to act”.38 For Aristotle and Aquinas, any transition from potentiality 
to actuality and, consequently, to activity, can only be brought about 
by something actual;39 “[t]he Aristotelian does not suppose that the 
inceptions of a thing’s changes can be referred to that thing’s nature 
alone”.40 Second, the Aristotelian powers are potentialities that turn into 
actualities if certain processes are triggered into action. Th is seems to 
imply that the extent in which things exercise their power varies; but 
according to Spinoza’s view, all power is always exhaustively used as 
necessitated by laws of God’s nature, and there is defi nitely no room 
for potentialities that would not become actualized. Th ird, although 
Spinoza refuses to adopt the traditional notion of passive power, his 
system nevertheless contains the idea that any thing’s active power 
matches its power—given Spinoza’s terminological choice, we should 
probably say liability—to be under passions. In Spinozistic terms, there 
is a connection between the power of acting and the capacity to be 
aff ected, so that the capacity of being aff ected in many diff erent ways 
corresponds to a great power of acting:
I say this in general, that in proportion as a Body is more capable than 
others of doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at 
once, so its Mind is more capable than others of perceiving many things 
at once.41
Whatever so disposes the human Body that it can be aff ected in a great 
many ways, or renders it capable of aff ecting external Bodies in a great 
many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the Body capable of 
being aff ected in a great many ways, or of aff ecting other bodies, the more 
useful it is [eo utilius, quo Corpus ab eo aptius redditur, ut pluribus modis 
affi  ciatur, aliaque corpora affi  ciat]; on the other hand, what renders the 
Body less capable of these things is harmful.42
38 Th omas Aquinas, Th e Principles of Nature, III.18.
39 James, Passion and Action, p. 35. On the Aristotelian principle of prior actuality, 
see pp. 82–86 in this volume.
40 Des Chene, Physiologia, p. 22. However, there is an important qualifi cation to 
this: “Self-movement, or what Averroes called the vis initiativa, is in fact the delimiting 




As we know, talented people, having extremely complexly structured 
minds and bodies, are not only capable of causing many diff erent kinds 
of eff ects but are also sensitive to many diff erent kinds of sorrow.
Conclusion
I hope to have shown that Spinoza provides a compelling theory of the 
basic causal architecture of the world by combining the necessitarianist 
monistic ontology with certain ideas stemming from the new science. 
In this original dynamistic metaphysic there is, sub specie æternitatis, 
only one causal agent, God, whose nature fi xes “from eternity and to 
eternity” those possibilities his power necessarily realizes; there can-
not be any unactualized possibilities, which justifi es labelling this line 
of thought an actualist one. According to it, God’s power can only be 
power of acting; but, alas, this is not so in our case, for even though 
our power is always fully exercised, there are changes in the degree 
in which it brings about actions. And these are not just any changes 
among others, for only those changes that aff ect our power qualify, for 
Spinoza, as ethically signifi cant.43
43 I would like to thank Olli Koistinen, Juhani Pietarinen, and Arto Repo for many 
helpful comments, as well as the audiences at the University of Turku and Uppsala 
University, in which I have presented earlier versions of this essay. 
